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THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE'S APPLICABILITY IN
DEPORTATION HEARINGS: INS v. LOPEZ-
MENDOZA
INTRODUCTION
The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of evidence obtained
through a search or seizure that violates the fourth amendment.1 Tra-
ditionally, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)2 applied the rule
to civil deportation proceedings.3 However, very few aliens challenged
the introduction of evidence on fourth amendment grounds.4 In 1979,
the BIA reversed its former stance and held in In re Sandoval 5 that
the rule would no longer apply. In Lopez-Mendoza v. INS,6 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the BIA's
decision. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision in
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,7 the Supreme Court's first ruling on the appli-
cability of the exclusionary rule in civil deportation proceedings.
The Supreme Court applied a cost-benefit analysis to determine
whether the exclusionary rule should be applied in civil deportation
proceedings. The Court found that the exclusionary rule does not sig-
nificantly deter violations by Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) officers. The Court balanced the minimal deterrence benefits of
applying the rule against the significant costs of reducing the effective-
1. The fourth amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. The exclusionary rule deters violations of the fourth amendment by
barring the use of evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and seizures. See infra
notes 9-32 and accompanying text.
2. An alien who is suspected of being in the country illegally has a right to a deporta-
tion hearing before an immigration law judge of the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice (INS). 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982). The five-member Bureau of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), which is separate from the INS, is an agency of the Department of Justice. 8 C.F.R.
§ 3.1 (1984). The BIA has appellate jurisdiction over the deportation decisions of INS
immigration law judges. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1984). For a complete discussion of the organi-
zational structure of the agencies enforcing the immigration laws, see J. WAsSERMAN,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 11-37 (3d ed. 1979).
3. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
4. Between 1952 and 1979, fewer than fifty challenges were brought. Lopez-Mendoza
v. INS, 705 F.2d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 1983). This number seems small in light of the
number of illegal aliens apprehended. Approximately fifty-thousand were apprehended in
1964. The number in 1979 was one million. A. LEIBowTrz, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
REFUGEE POLICY 6-1 (1983).
5. 17 I. & N. Dec. 70 (BIA 1979).
6. 705 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984).
7. 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984).
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ness of enforcing the immigration laws and concluded that the rule
should not be applied.
This Note takes the position that the Court erred in finding that
the exclusionary rule provides little deterrence in the deportation area
and that it exaggerated the social costs of applying the rule. The
exclusionary rule provides the deterrence that is needed for the protec-
tion of the fourth amendment rights and fifth amendment equal pro-
tection interests of aliens subject to civil deportation proceedings. The
benefits of deterrence outweigh a realistic assessment of the rule's
costs.
Section I presents the general background of the exclusionary rule
and its application in civil deportation proceedings. Section II
describes the facts and holding of INS v. Lopez-Mendoza. Section III
analyzes the Court's decision.
I. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. APPLICATION IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
The exclusionary rule protects fourth amendment rights by bar-
ring the use in judicial and administrative proceedings of evidence
obtained by an unlawful search or seizure." Until recently, the rule
was seen as a direct constitutional mandate. In its original formula-
tion of the rule in Weeks v. United States, 9 the Supreme Court stated
that the use of illegally obtained evidence in a federal court would
produce "a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused."10
Nearly fifty years later, when the Court extended the rule to the states
in Mapp v. Ohio,11 it still perceived the rule as "a clear, specific and
constitutionally required . . . safeguard."' 12 The Mapp Court also
acknowledged the rule's use as a deterrent of governmental miscon-
duct 13 and a means of preserving judicial integrity. 14 Justice Harlan,
dissenting in Mapp, argued that the rule is not constitutionally com-
pelled but is a federal remedy aimed at deterrence.1 5 Later decisions
increasingly emphasized the deterrence rationale without rejecting the
rule's constitutional basis.16
8. See generally Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Devel-
opment and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1365 (1983).
9. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
10. Id. at 398.
11. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
12. Id at 648. See supra Stewart, note 8, at 1380.
13. 367 U.S. at 651.
14. Id. at 659-60.
15. Id. at 680 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
16. In Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), the Court found that the extra
deterrent value to be gained did not justify excluding probative evidence against the defend-
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Finally, in United States v. Calandra,17 the Court characterized
the exclusionary rule as a "judicially created remedy designed to safe-
guard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." 18
The Court stated that "the purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to
redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim."' 19 Later deci-
sions quoted Calandra's language and followed its approach. 20 The
Court no longer regards the rule as a personal constitutional right.
The Court now applies the rule on a case-by-case basis by weighing the
benefit of the rule's deterrent effect 2' in a given context against the
societal costs of the rule's application. 22
The change in the rule's justification and the adoption of cost-
benefit balancing make the rule vulnerable to erosion.23 Chief Justice
Burger expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the rule both before his
appointment to the Court24 and as Chief Justice.25 Other justices have
ant because of a violation of a constitutional right of his co-conspirator. Id. at 174-75. In
Linldetter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), the Court reaffirmed the Mapp view of the rule
as "an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments," id. at 634, but
found that Mapp's deterrent purpose would not be served by applying the rule retrospec-
tively. Id. at 636-37.
17. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
18. Id. at 348.
19. "'[T]he ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored.
Reparation comes too late.'" Id. at 347 (quoting Linidetter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637
(1965)).
20. See, eg., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) (little additional deterrence to
be gained by use of rule in a federal habeas corpus review of state convictions); United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (deterrent benefit not strong enough to justify
excluding from a federal civil proceeding evidence illegally seized for a state criminal pro-
ceeding); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1975) (policies underlying exclu-
sionary rule did not require retroactive application of holding that warrantless automobile
search was unconstitutional).
21. Earlier the Court referred to "the imperative of judicial integrity" as a second bene-
fit to be gained by applying the exclusionary rule. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
222 (1960). "'[A] conviction resting on evidence secured through such a flagrant disregard
of the procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand without mak-
ing the courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of law."' Id. at 223 (quoting
McNabb v. United States 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943)). More recent opinions, however, take
the position that this factor plays a limited role in the justification of the exclusionary rule.
See, e-g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976).
22. The Court set out the framework for this balancing in United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433, 447-60 (1976). Although Janis was a civil proceeding, the framework is equally
applicable to criminal proceedings. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3412 (1984).
23. Commentators have expressed concern that erosion may ultimately lead to total
abolition of the rule, especially given the likelihood of President Reagan's appointment of
conservative justices to the Court. See, eg., Vitiello & Burger, Mapp's Exclusionary Rule:
Is the Court Crying Wolf?, 86 DicK. L. Rnv. 15, 15-19 (1981).
24. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. Rnv. 1, 10 (1964)
("[S]ociety must inquire whether the Suppression Doctrine has in fact accomplished its
stated purpose of deterrence and meet the frustrated and plaintive cry that 'There must be a
better way to do it.' ").
25. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 415 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (rule is "conceptually sterile and practically inef-
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also expressed dissatisfaction with the rule and indicated a willingness
to change the rule or dispose of it.26 Objections to the rule focus pri-
marily on the high societal costs of releasing defendants 27 and on the
rule's questionable deterrence value. 28 "The debate within the Court
on the exclusionary rule has always been a warm one,"' 29 but the trend
toward narrowing the rule has been clear. The Burger Court's grow-
ing resistance to the rule led to the adoption of a "good faith" excep-
tion. In United States v. Leon, 30 which was handed down on the same
day as the Lopez-Mendoza decision, the Court held that the exclusion-
ary rule does not apply when police officers acted in reasonable reli-
ance on a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate but later found
fective" as deterrent); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 500 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(rule is "Draconian, discredited device in its present absolutist form").
26. Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun joined the Chief Justice's reference to the hold-
ing in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), as "another manifestation of the practical
poverty of the judge-made exclusionary rule." 444 U.S. at 97 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Justice White first indicated his willingness to modify Mapp in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 537-38 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). Justice Powell expressed an interest in develop-
ing a sliding scale approach to fourth amendment violations in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590, 609-612 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part). See also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 266-71 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (questioning rule's effectiveness as a
deterrent and emphasizing that rule's value varies according to the setting); California v.
Minjares, 443 U.S. 916, 927 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of stay) ("It
would be quite rational, I think, for the criminal trial to take place either without any
application of the exclusionary rule in either federal or state cases, or at least without any
application in state cases.").
27. Public and political outcry is strong when violent criminals return to the streets
because of police error. See Goodpaster, An Essay on Ending the Exclusionary Rule, 33
HASTINGS L.J. 1065, 1085 (1982); Stewart, supra note 8, at 1393.
28. The deterrence value of the rule is difficult to prove or disprove; studies have
addressed the question, but the results are open to doubt. See United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433, 449-54 & n.22 (1976). The Court found itself in "no better position" than it had
been in 1960, when it stated in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960):
Empirical statistics are not available to show that the inhabitants of states which
follow the exclusionary rule suffer less from lawless searches and seizures than do
those of states which admit evidence unlawfully obtained. Since as a practical mat-
ter it is never easy to prove a negative, it is hardly likely the conclusive factual data
could ever be assembled.
Janis, 428 U.S. at 453. See also.Canon, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Critics Proven That
It Doesn't Deter Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 398 (1979) (evidence is inconclusive; rule's success
rate varies among cities); Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents Proven
That It Is a Deterrent to Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 404 (1979) (rule's proponents have not
sustained burden of proving its effectiveness).
29. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976). In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), the Court decided by a 5-4 majority to extend the exclusionary rule to the states.
This split is indicative of exclusionary rule decisions. See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128 (1954) (5-4 decision; five opinions filed); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1960) (5-4 decision); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (6-3 decision). One
commentator stated, "the Burger Court has responded to fourth amendment challenges
with doctrinal schizophrenia, obscuring as a result the actual theoretical or ideological
basis for its exclusionary rulings." Burkoff, The Court that Devoured the Fourth Amend-
ment: The Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. Rnv. 151, 191
(1979).
30. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
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invalid.31 The good faith exception can be viewed as the culmination
of reliance on deterrence as the rationale for the exclusionary rule.3 2
B. APPLICATION IN DEPORTATION AND OTHER CIVIL
PROCEEDINGS
Although the Supreme Court has never applied the exclusionary
rule in a civil case,33 it has not stated that the rule is unsuitable for use
in civil cases simply because they are civil.34 In United States v.
Janis,35 the Court applied the balancing test in a civil context for the
first time. It held that the costs of applying the rule outweigh the
benefits when the offending officer and the entity seeking to introduce
the illegally obtained evidence are agents of different sovereigns. 36 The
Court reserved the question whether the balancing test could lead to a
31. Justice White, writing the majority opinion in this 6-3 decision, reasoned that the
exclusionary rule cannot deter reasonable mistakes. If police officers reasonably believed
that the procedures they followed were correct, their future behavior would be unaffected
by a decision that the warrant they used was defective. Justice White had previously set
forth this position in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 537-42 (1976) (White, J., dissenting),
and in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2336-47 (1983) (White, J., concurring).
The reasonable belief exception drew heated public debate because it was seen as the
most drastic alteration of the exclusionary rule since its establishment. See N.Y. Times,
July 6, 1984, at B-16, col. 1 (ABA Journal poll found split decision by the Court reflected a
similar split among the nation's lawyers); Kamisar, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1984, at A-25, col.
1 (establishment of exception brings rule one step closer to its ultimate demise).
32. "It now appears that the Court's victory over the Fourth Amendment is complete.
That today's decision represents the piece de resistance of the Court's past efforts cannot be
doubted.. .. " United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3430 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33. In Janis, the Court noted that it had never applied the exclusionary rule to a civil
proceeding. 428 U.S. at 447. That is still true. The Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the rule applied in a civil liquor license revocation hearing, but the issue became
moot when the licensed establishment went out of business. Board of License Comm'rs,
105 S. Ct. 685 (1984). The Court applied the exclusionary rule in a non-criminal proceed-
ing for forfeiture of an article used in violation of the criminal law in One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965), relying on the fact that "forfeiture is clearly a
penalty for the criminal offense." Id. at 701.
34. The strongest objection to use of the rule in criminal trials, that high social costs
will result when criminal defendants are released because of police error, does not apply in
the civil sphere. See supra note 27. Most civil defendants, illegal aliens in particular, pose
little danger to the community. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
35. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
36. In Janis, a state police officer obtained evidence of the defendant's bookmaking
activity pursuant to a defective warrant. Id. at 434-38. The officer notified an IRS agent
that the defendant had been arrested for bookmaking, and the agent assessed wagering
taxes against the defendant. Ia at 436. The issue on certiorari was whether the evidence
illegally seized by the state police was excludable in a federal civil proceeding brought by
the IRS. The Court weighed the benefit of deterrence of future violations that the rule
would provide in this context against the societal cost to the enforcement of valid laws. Id.
at 454. It found the deterrence benefit to be "highly attenuated when the 'punishment'
imposed upon the offending criminal enforcement officer is a removal of that evidence from
a civil suit by or against a different sovereign." Id. at 458. It also found that the existing
deterrence effected by exclusion of the evidence from both state and federal criminal trials
made further exclusion less valuable. Id.
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different result when the violation is intrasovereign 3 7
The courts of appeals routinely exclude illegally seized evidence
in civil proceedings.38 For example, in Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 39
the Seventh Circuit excluded improperly seized documents from an
FTC hearing. The court emphasized the fourth amendment's guaran-
tee of the people's right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects."'4° The court concluded that this right is not affected by
the nature of the proceeding.41 Similarly, in Rogers v. United States,4
2
the First Circuit excluded illegally seized liquor from use in a civil suit
by the government to recover customs duties.
Before INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court did not con-
front the issue of the exclusionary rule's applicability to deportation
proceedings. However, the Court had stated in dicta that "it may be
assumed" 43 that the rule applies. This was thought to be the rule.
Several lower courts refused to admit illegally obtained evidence in
deportation proceedings.44 The major treatise in immigration law
states that the exclusionary rule's application to deportation proceed-
ings is "undisputed. ' 45 The BIA assumed "in countless cases" 46 that
the rule applied. In virtually all of those cases, however, the BIA
found that the arrest leading to the evidence was legal or that
independent, untainted evidence was sufficient to uphold the deporta-
tion order.4 7 The BIA's 1979 decision in In re Sandoval was the first
37. "The seminal cases that apply the exclusionary rule to a civil proceeding involve
intrasovereign violations, a situation we need not consider here." Id. at 456. Deportation
proceedings such as the one in Lopez-Mendoza are not only intrasovereign but intra-
agency. INS arresting officers are the same officials who bring deportation actions; their
primary objective in seizing evidence is to use it in civil deportation proceedings.
38. The Ninth Circuit Lopez-Mendoza opinion lists a number of these cases. 705 F.2d
at 1070-71. n.15.
39. 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968).
40. Id. at 534.
41. "We must not be misled by the legal classification of the nature of the proceeding."
Id.
42. 97 F.2d 691 (1st Cir. 1938).
43. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923).
44. See Wong Chung Che v. INS, 565 F.2d 166, 169 (1st Cir. 1977) (if an alien's land-
ing permit was obtained "through an illegal search, there is no authority of which we are
aware that would make it admissible."); Ex parte Jackson, 263 F. 110, 112-13 (D. Mont.
1920), appeal dismissed sub nom. Andrews v. Jackson, 267 F. 1022 (9th Cir. 1920) ("the
deportation proceedings [were] unfair and invalid, in that they [were] based upon evidence
and procedure that violate the search and seizure and due process clauses of the Constitu-
tion."); United States v. Wong Quong Wong, 94 F. 832, 834 (D. Vt. 1899).
45. IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 5.2c,
at 5-31 (rev. ed. 1977). Accord, J. WASSERMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 145
(1973).
46. In re Sandoval, 17 I & N Dec. 70, 93 (Applemen, dissenting in part, concurring in
part) (BIA 1979).
47. See, eg., In re Perez-Lopez, 14 I & N Dec. 79 (BIA 1972) (after suppression of
illegally obtained evidence and termination of proceeding, case re-opened based on an
independent tip; BIA upheld resulting deportation order, refusing to allow alien to gain
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holding by any judicial or administrative body that the exclusionary
rule did not apply to deportation proceedings.48
II. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza: FACTS AND HOLDING
On June 23, 1977, INS officers entered the Pasco, Washington
plant where Sandoval-Sanchez49 worked. The officers did not have a
search warrant, but they did have company the permission of com-
pany officials to question employeesA0 While standing at the plant's
main entrance during a shift change, the officers asked innocuous
questions in English to workers who aroused their suspicion. Those
who did not respond were interrogated in Spanish about their right to
be in the United States. The officers detained some individuals for
further questioning and transported thirty-seven workers to the
county jail for processing.5 1 About one-third chose to depart volunta-
rily for Mexico and were processed immediately and placed on a bus.5 2
Sandoval-Sanchez exercised his right to a deportation hearing. Dur-
"permanent residence" because of one fourth amendment violation). These cases are listed
in Brief for Respondents at 67-68, n.47-48, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984).
48. The BIA addressed the question as one of first impression in In re Sandoval
because past decisions had not analyzed the appropriateness of the rule's application. 17 I
& N Dec. 70, 75 (BIA 1979). The BIA attached great significance to the classification of
deportation proceedings as civil rather than criminal. Id. at 76-77. Even after In re Sando-
val, the BIA has continued to exclude illegally obtained evidence in certain circumstances.
In In re Garcia, 17 I & N Dec. 319 (BIA 1980), the BIA held that due process required
exclusion from the record of an alien's admissions because the INS had violated his fifth
amendment rights by refusing his repeated requests for a lawyer, holding him incommuni-
cado and failing to inform him of his right to a hearing. Because the admissions were the
sole evidence supporting deportability, the proceedings were terminated. See also In re
Garcia-Flores, 17 I & N Dec. 325, 327 (BIA 1980) (violation of a regulatory requirement
that an alien be advised of his right to an attorney can result in exclusion of alien's state-
ment from evidence).
49. There were two respondents: Lopez-Mendoza and Sandoval-Sanchez (not the
same party as in In re Sandoval). Both contended that their arrests violated the fourth
amendment. Lopez-Mendoza, however, objected only to being summoned to a deportation
hearing following an unlawful arrest, not to the use of the evidence that was a fruit of the
arrest. The Supreme Court thus decided Lopez-Mendoza's case on the basis of the rule
that the "identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never
itself suppressible as a fruit of unlawful arrest[.]" 104 S. Ct. at 3485. Analysis of the ruling
on Lopez-Mendoza's claim is beyond the scope of this Note. Sandoval-Sanchez, on the
other hand, challenged the admission of evidence at his deportation hearing. This Note
addresses only the Court's holding on Sandoval-Sanchez's claim.
50. Id. at 3483. The INS may conduct factory searches without a search warrant if the
owner or manager consents. See INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984). In Delgado the
Court held that factory "surveys" involving individual questioning of employees are not a
seizure of the workforce under the fourth amendment unless the circumstances are so
intimidating that a reasonable person would believe he is not free to leave. Probable cause
to suspect illegal presence in the factory is still required for arrest of an employee.
51. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. at 3483.
52. Id. at 3483-84. Individuals detained on suspicion of illegal alienage have a right to
a deportation hearing. Alternatively, they can choose to return home without further pro-
ceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 242.5(a)(2) (1984); see 2 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 45,
§ 7.2, at 7-15-7-31.
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ing further questioning, he admitted unlawful entry.5 3
At his deportation hearing, Sandoval-Sanchez contended that the
written record of his admission 54 should be suppressed as the fruit of
an unlawful arrest.5 5 The immigration judge rejected Sandoval-
Sanchez's claim that he was illegally arrested, but ruled in the alterna-
tive that the legality of the arrest was not relevant to the deportation
hearing because of the civil nature of the proceedings.5 6 He issued a
deportation order under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2).57 The BIA held on
appeal that Sandoval-Sanchez's statements were voluntary and not the
fruit of the arrest. The Board thus did not find it necessary to address
53. Sandoval-Sanchez later contended that he was not aware of his right to remain
silent. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. at 3484. Courts have held that the absence of a Miranda
warning does not render a voluntary statement inadmissible in a deportation case. See
Avila-Gallegos v. INS, 525 F.2d 666, 667 (2d Cir. 1975) (Miranda warnings not required
either before alien is taken into custody or after arrest); Chavez-Raya v. INS, 519 F.2d 397,
402 (7th Cir. 1975) ("In deportation proceedings, however-in light of the alien's burden of
proof, the requirement that the alien answer nonincriminating questions, the potential
adverse consequences to the alien of remaining silent, and the fact that an alien's statement
is admissible in the deportation hearing despite his lack of counsel at the preliminary inter-
rogation-Miranda warnings would be not only inappropriate, but could also serve to mis-
lead the alien.") However, the court in Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803, 808 (1st Cir.
1977), stated that although Miranda warnings are not required, their absence may be rele-
vant in assessing the voluntariness of a statement.
54. Form 1-213 (Record of Deportable Alien) contains information on alienage,
whether the alien is subject to deportation, whether he will depart without deportation
proceedings, and whether he should be arrrested or released. See Wasserman, supra note 2,
at 233-36. An officer completed INS Form 1-213 on the basis of Sandoval-Sanchez's
answers to questions about his immigration status; the form indicated that Sandoval-
Sanchez was a native of Mexico and had entered the U.S. "without inspection." Lopez-
Mendoza v. INS, 705 F.2d at 1062.
55. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. at 3484. Sandoval-Sanchez's arrest would have
been legal only if the officers had had probable cause to suspect illegal alienage. See Draper
v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). A lesser standard of "reasonable suspicion" is suffi-
cient to justify brief investigative stops. The "reasonable suspicion" standard was first set
out in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967). The standard is objective, measuring when a police
officer would reasonably believe an offense had been committed. Due weight is given "to
the specific reasonable inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in
light of his experience." Id. at 27. See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
881 (1974) ("when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular
vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car briefly and
investigate"). However, Sandoval-Sanchez's detention and transportation to the jail consti-
tuted an arrest. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979) (when a person is
transported to a police station and placed in an interrogation room, the detention, in con-
trast to a less intrusive brief stop, is "in important respects indistinguishable from a tradi-
tional arrest" and must be supported by probable cause).
The standards to be met in INS arrests vary according to the context and location of the
officers' actions. The Court requires probable cause for an actual arrest or intrusive deten-
tion. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). Reasonable suspicion is accepted
for less intrusive actions such as investigatory stops in the immediate border area. See
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-60 (1976).
56. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. at 3484.
57. Lopez-Mendoza v. INS, 705 F.2d at 1060. In deportation proceedings involving
illegal entry into the country, the government must prove alienage. The burden then shifts
to the alien, who must prove his legal status in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1351 (1982).
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the legality of the arrest or the applicability of the exclusionary rule.5 8
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the deporta-
tion order.59 The court held that Sandoval-Sanchez's admission of
alienage was the fruit of an illegal arrest6° and that the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule bars the use of illegally obtained evidence in a
civil deportation hearing. The court reached this decision by balanc-
ing deterrence benefits against societal costs. 61
A divided Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. The
majority, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, determined that the
"unusual and significant" 62 social costs of applying the exclusionary
rule in deportation proceedings outweigh the rule's deterrence value.
Four justices dissented. Of the dissenters, Justice White63 was
closest to the majority in his approach. He agreed that the exclusion-
ary rule's benefits must be balanced against its costs,64 but disagreed
with the majority's assessment of the benefits and costs in deportation
proceedings.65
58. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. at 3483; In re Sandoval-Sanchez, No. A22 346 925
(BIA, Feb. 21, 1980).
59. Lopez-Mendoza v. INS, 705 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 3479
(1984).
60. In addition to holding that the officers had not met the probable cause standard
required for an arrest, the court doubted the sufficiency of the officers' suspicion of Sando-
val-Sanchez's illegal alienage to justify even a brief investigative stop. The testifying officer
could not remember Sandoval or describe his behavior; it was not clear which of the two
arresting officers had selected him for detention. Id. at 1062.
61. The Ninth Circuit carefully followed the steps the Supreme Court laid out in
United States v. Janis. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
62. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. at 3488.
63. Id. at 3491-95 (White, J., dissenting).
64. Id. Justice Brennan, on the other hand, argued that the exclusionary rule is a con-
stitutional right directly required by the fourth amendment, regardless of its effectiveness as
a deterrent. Id. at 3491 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his dissent in United States v. Leon,
104 S. Ct. at 3430, Justice Brennan offered a more detailed analysis of "the Court's gradual
but determined strangulation of the rule," explaining that
because seizures are executed principally to secure evidence, and because such evi-
dence generally has utility in our legal system only in the context of a trial super-
vised by a judge, it is apparent that the admission of illegally obtained evidence
implicates the same constitutional concerns as the initial seizure of that evidence.
Id. at 3432. He argued that by "drawing an artificial line" between constitutional responsi-
bilities of the police and the courts, the majority reflected an "impoverished understanding
of judicial responsibility in our constitutional scheme." Id. at 3433. This Note does not
take a position on the question whether the exclusionary rule is required by the fourth
amendment or is applicable only when the deterrence value of applying the rule outweighs
the social costs. See supra notes 9-22 and accompanying text. Rather, the position of this
Note is that a correct balancing of costs and benefits would require application of the exclu-
sionary rule in deportation proceedings. This position would leave the Court's deterrence
approach to the rule intact.
65. Id. at 3491-95. Justice Stevens joined all but one part of Justice White's dissent.
Id. at 3496 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He did not join the part relying on United States v.
Leon because the Court had not yet applied that case's rule to warrantless searches. Justice
Marshall filed a separate dissent agreeing with Justice White's analysis but arguing that
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III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's opinion in Lopez-Mendoza appeared on the
same day as a controversial decision lessening the rule's effect in crimi-
nal trials, United States v. Leon.66 In deciding Lopez-Mendoza, the
Court acknowledged neither a general dissatisfaction with the rule67
nor a desire to avoid inconsistency with Leon68 as factors in its deci-
sion that the rule is inapplicable in deportation proceedings. However,
it was predictable that the Court would not extend the rule to civil
proceedings while simultaneously limiting the rule's traditional
applications. 69
A. CIvIL/CRIMINAL DIsTINCTION
The Court pointed out that deportation is "a purely civil
action."' 70 After noting various protections available to the criminal
defendant but not applicable in a deportation hearing, the Court stated
that "a deportation hearing is intended to provide a streamlined deter-
mination of eligibility to remain in this country, nothing more. ' 71 The
Court explained that unlike a criminal trial, a deportation proceeding
looks prospectively and puts little weight on past conduct. Past con-
duct is of limited relevance in a deportation proceeding because depor-
tation is not punishment for unlawful entry.72 The opinion is not clear
as to whether the Court attributes controlling significance to the civil/
criminal distinction. 73
The civil/criminal distinction should not be of controlling signifi-
cance. Commentators have argued that deportation should be reclas-
sified as a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding74 and that
such analysis should be unnecessary because the rule is constitutionally mandated. Id. at
3495 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
68. A different result in Lopez-Mendoza would have been consistent with Leon; Justice
White wrote both the majority opinion in Leon carving out a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule and a strong dissent in Lopez-Mendoza.
69. The dissenting opinion in the Ninth Circuit case pointed out, "[ilt is. . . remarka-
ble that the majority has [held that the exclusionary rule applies to deportation proceed-
ings] at a time when the United States Supreme Court has raised questions as to whether
[the exclusionary rule as it applies to criminal trials should be modified]." 705 F.2d at 1075
(Alarcon, J., dissenting).
70. 104 S. Ct. at 3484-85.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. The Court did not state that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable simply because
deportation hearings are civil proceedings, but looked at other characteristics of deporta-
tion proceedings. See infra Section III(B)(1), (3).
74. See Comment, The Exclusionary Rule in Deportation Proceedings, 14 U.C.D. L.
Rlv. 955, 959-64 (1981) (stressing punitive effect of deportation on alien); Fragomen, Pro-
cedural Aspects of Illegal Search and Seizure in Deportation Cases, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
151, 154-58 (1963) (relying on statutory distinctions among types of aliens); Navasky,
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deportation defendants should be afforded the full range of constitu-
tional rights applicable to such proceedings.75 The commentators
focus on the effect of deportation on the alien.76 The courts' "civil"
classification, on the other hand, focuses on the government's inten-
tion in initiating the proceedings, reasoning that deportation is a sim-
ple exercise of the sovereign power to expel those who do not comply
with the immigration laws.77 The civil or criminal nature of a pro-
Deportation as Punishment, 27 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 213, 232 (1959) (drawing on historical
notions of banishment as support for the thesis that deportation is punishment).
75. Although the standard of proof required in deportation cases is midway between
those required in criminal and other civil trials, other due process elements of the statutory
scheme are patently more civil than criminal. Unlike the criminal defendant who is pre-
sumed innocent until proven guilty, the alien may be required to show that he is legally
present, subject to a presumption of illegality if he fails to meet this burden. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (1982). There is no right to a jury trial in a deportation proceeding, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b) (1982), nor does the state bear the expense for counsel. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1982).
INS agents are not required to give Miranda warnings in the apprehension stage of depor-
tation. The court in Chavez-Raya v. INS, 519 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1975), reasoned that a
Miranda warning is unnecessary and misleading because an alien who remains silent may
suffer an adverse inference.
76. See Navasky, supra note 74, at 215 ("[V]irtually every major deportation case to
reach the Supreme Court is a case-study in human suffering."); Comment, supra note 74, at
960 ("[IThe inquiry should focus on the effect that deportation has on the alien rather than
on the source and extent of the government's power."). Viewed from the perspective of a
long-term resident with family and occupational ties in this country, deportation may be
equated with punishment; the resulting personal disaster may be of greater proportion than
that stemming from criminal penalties.
Courts have not totally ignored the aliens' perspective on deportation. The Supreme
Court has recognized that although "deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding,
it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and
work in this land of freedom. That deportation is a penalty-at times a most serious one-
cannot be doubted." Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (rejecting prejudicial
testimony as basis to deport an alien for membership in Communist Party). Because of this
realization, the Court imposes a more stringent standard of proof in deportation proceed-
ings than the preponderance standard of civil proceedings; the government must prove
deportability by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S.
276, 285 (1966) (acknowledging drastic deprivation that can result from deportation and
requiring the same standard that applied in denaturalization and expatriation cases). One
district court took the extreme step of holding that the deportation of an alien for a mari-
juana conviction constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Lieggi v. INS, 389 F. Supp. 12
(N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd, 529 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1976).
77. Some old cases indicate that there is punishment if the victim suffers deprivation of
any civil or political rights. See, e.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866)
(overturning the conviction of a priest who refused to take an oath imposed by the state
constitution). Today courts usually examine the intent of Congress in deciding whether a
statute is punitive. In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), for example, the Court deter-
mined that congressional intent to punish made a regulatory statute criminal in nature.
The Supreme Court clearly spelled out its view that deportation is civil in nature in Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893):
It is not a banishment, in the sense in which that word is often applied to the
expulsion of a citizen from his country by way of punishment. It is but a method
of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who has not complied with
the conditions upon the performance of which the government of the nation, acting
within its constitutional authority and through the proper departments has deter-
mined that his continuing to reside shall depend.
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ceeding should be considered only if it is related to the purpose of
applying the exclusionary rule, which is to deter fourth amendment
violations. 78 From this perspective, the civil/criminal distinction
seems insignificant in the deportation context.79
B. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
After characterizing deportation hearings as civil proceedings,
the Court applied the Janis cost-benefit analysis to determine whether
the exclusionary rule should apply in deportation hearings. The Court
first looked at the rule's value as a deterrent.
L Deterrence Benefit
The Court conceded that the rule is a stronger deterrent in this
case than in Janis because the violation in the deportation context is
"intrasovereign" and because the arresting officer's primary objective
is to use the evidence in the civil proceeding.80 However, the Court
found that four factors reduced the deterrence value of the rule in civil
deportation proceedings and concluded that these factors prevented
the rule from providing significant deterrence.81 In his dissent, Justice
White rebutted each of the majority's assertions about the rule's
reduced deterrence value, arguing that there is no principled basis for
distinguishing between the rule's value in criminal cases and civil
deportation proceedings.82
First, the majority pointed out that even if an arrest is illegal, an
alien could be deported if there is enough evidence derived indepen-
dently from the arrest to support deportation. 83 Justice White denied
that this reduces deterrence; in criminal trials convictions can be
obtained despite the suppression of some evidence. 84 The possibility
that deportation can result from evidence obtained legally from
another source seems neither as important as the majority believes nor
as irrelevant as the dissent believes. The dissent correctly pointed out
78. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
79. The Court suggested that the deterrence value of applying the rule in a civil pro-
ceeding may be less where, as in deportation, the civil proceeding is a complement to a
possible criminal prosecution. The deterrence gained by excluding evidence from a civil
proceeding is not as great when some deterrence is already provided by exclusion of the
same evidence from a complementary criminal proceeding. 104 S. Ct. at 3486. However,
the Court also acknowledged that few alien arrests lead to criminal prosecutions and that
the arresting officer's primary objective is to use the evidence in a civil proceeding. Id.
80. Id. See supra note 36.
81. "[A]pplication of the rule in INS civil deportation proceedings, as in the circum-
stances discussed in Janis, is unlikely to provide significant, much less substantial deter-
rence." Id. at 3488 (citation omitted).
82. Id. at 3491-95 (White, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 3487.
84. Id. at 3492 (White, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 18:125
EXCL USIONAR Y RULE: DEPORTATION
that the same possibility exists in the criminal context. However, the
government's lower burden of proof in a civil proceeding may be sig-
nificant, as the majority asserted.85 In a criminal proceeding, the pros-
ecution must submit enough other evidence to enable the jury to find
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In a deportation proceeding, where
there is no presumption of innocence, the INS need only submit
enough evidence to establish identity and alienage.86
Second, the majority asserted that because many arrested illegal
aliens elect to return home without a formal hearing, and of those who
elect to have a hearing few raise fourth amendment challenges, INS
officers know it is unlikely that an arrestee will bring such a challenge.
Therefore, the Court concluded that an officer is "most unlikely to
shape his conduct in anticipation of the exclusion of evidence at a for-
mal deportation hearing." T87 Justice White found that this factor, like
the first, is no more significant in a deportation case than in a criminal
case. He pointed to a parallel between an alien's ability to elect volun-
tary departure and a criminal defendant's option to plead guilty, argu-
ing that neither possibility significantly dilutes the rule's deterrent
effect.88 The majority's argument is effective. Although criminal
defendants have the option to plead guilty, the number of criminal
defendants who do so is far lower than the number of illegal aliens
who agree to voluntary departure without a hearing. INS statistics
show that even when the exclusionary rule was in effect, the vast
majority of aliens apprehended chose to depart voluntarily; fewer than
2.5% were deported following formal adjudication. 89 Officers might
reasonably assume that an alien would forego a valid complaint rather
than risk damaging his status for re-entry.
Third, the Court argued that application of the exclusionary rule
would add little to the INS's own "comprehensive scheme" 90 for
deterring fourth amendment violations, which includes instruction in
fourth amendment law for new officers and guidelines of proper con-
duct. Justice White denigrated the effectiveness of the INS's scheme.91
He pointed out that the INS developed its program when the rule was
in force, suggesting that the rule created the incentive to develop the
program.92 The majority was apparently willing to assume that the
85. Id. at 3487.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 3492 (White, J., dissenting).
89. STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
(1979) (cited in the Ninth Circuit opinion, 705 F.2d at 1071 n.17).
90. 104 S. Ct. at 3487.
91. Id. at 3492-93 (White, J., dissenting). "IT]he INS . . . points to not a single
instance in which that scheme has been involved." Id.
92. Id. at 3493 (White, J., dissenting).
1985]
138 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:125
INS's internal procedures are effective. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals instead considered the ineffectiveness of internal self-policing
by other law enforcement agencies93 and placed the burden on the INS
to show that its procedures are different.94 The INS failed to meet
that burden. 95
Fourth, the Court focused on the availability of alternative reme-
dies such as declaratory relief for improper INS practices.96 Justice
White argued that dependence on alternative remedies is unrealistic.
Illegal aliens against whom the INS illegally obtains evidence are
promptly removed from the country, and many of the INS's victims
who are in the country legally are poor and uneducated and cannot
speak English.97 Alternative remedies are rare and difficult to obtain.
In order to qualify for injunctive relief, the victim of an illegal INS
search or seizure must show a real and immediate threat of future
harm; a demonstration of past violations only serves as evidence bear-
ing on whether such a threat exists.98 To establish the likelihood of
future harm, applicants for injunctive relief must also show wide-
spread violations resulting from an official INS policy.99 Citizens and
93. The court was reluctant to place responsibility for protecting citizens and aliens
from unwarranted government intrusion with the same officers responsible for enforcing
the immigration laws. 705 F.2d at 1074.
94. "'It would. . be myopic to presume from the existence of a remedy its effective-
ness and consistent implementation.'" Id. (quoting Note, The Exclusionary Rule in Depor-
tation Proceedings: Time for Alternatives, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 349, 371 (1980).
95. The Respondent's brief in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza explained that the INS does not
compile identifiable statistics on fourth amendment violations. It instead includes those
complaints among civil rights complaints and destroys its records after a specified time
period. The INS was unable to show that any officer had been disciplined for a fourth
amendment violation since the BIA held the exclusionary rule inapplicable in 1979. Its
only disciplinary cases involved more egregious misconduct such as physical abuse and
rape of aliens. Brief for Respondent at 55, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479. The
failure of the internal disciplinary system to stop even such flagrant brutality has drawn
publicity. See J. CREWDSON, THE TARNISHED DOOR (1983) at 143-171, 208-212; U.S.
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR (1980) at 117-129
(Department of Justice audits of past and present INS procedures reveal improvements and
remaining complaint resolution deficiencies); U.S. Immigration Service Hampered by Cor-
ruption, N. Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1980, at Al, col. 2; "Violence, Often Unchecked, Pervades
Border Patrol," N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1980, at Al, col. 2, cited in Brief for Respondent at
55, n.34, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479.
96. 104 S. Ct. at 3488.
97. Id. at 3493 (White, J., dissenting).
98. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1667 (1983) (refusing injunctive
relief to plaintiff injured by police officer's unjustified use of chokehold for failure to show
likelihood that plaintiff would again be victimized by police chokeholds). See Brief for
Respondents at 48-50, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479.
99. See Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976) (granting
injunctive relief to Mexican plaintiffs who demonstrated "a specific pattern of conduct, akin
to an explicit policy" by INS officers), modified on rehearing en banc, 548 F.2d 715 (1977);
see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373-76 (1976).
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resident aliens can bring civil actions for damages,1c° but they are
expensive, time-consuming, and rarely successful.' 0 1 It is highly
unlikely that an INS agent would be deterred from illegally obtaining
evidence by the remote possibility that an arrestee might seek a
remedy.
The four factors cited by the majority probably have some effect
on the exclusionary rule's deterrent value in civil deportation. But the
factors are not as significant as the majority suggests; most of Justice
White's arguments in rebuttal are persuasive. The "'primary objec-
tive' of the INS agent is 'to use evidence in the civil deportation pro-
ceeding'."' 0 2 If INS officers know that evidence obtained in an illegal
arrest will be excluded from civil deportation proceedings, they will be
less likely to violate the fourth amendment.
2. Equal Protection Concerns-The Need for Deterrence
The respondents in Lopez-Mendoza argued that the role of race
and ethnicity in INS enforcement decisions added "equal protection
overtones" to the fourth amendment problem in the case.10 3 The
Court recognized "that respondents raise here legitimate and impor-
tant concems,"' 1 4 but did not examine the issue in depth because of its
conclusion that the exclusionary rule did not provide enough deter-
rence to add significant protection to fourth amendment rights.'05
This Note argues that the exclusionary rule does provide significant
deterrence to violative INS conduct. Therefore, it is appropriate to
consider equal protection concerns when applying the exclusionary
rule balancing test.
100. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Nained Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971), the Court held that money damages were a proper remedy for injuries caused
by a fourth amendment violation by federal officials. The petitioner in that case sought
damages for "great humiliation, embarrassment and mental suffering." Id. at 388-90.
101. See Brief for Respondent at 51, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479.
102. 104 S. Ct. at 3492 (White, J., dissenting).
103. Brief for Respondents at 95, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479. Respondents
raised this point in their argument that the social costs of not applying the rule here would
be excessive. They argued that the loss of the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings
would result in "open season" on Hispanic Americans. Id. at 99.
104. 104 S. Ct. at 3488. "Respondents contend that retention of the exclusionary rule is
necessary to safeguard the Fourth Amendment rights of ethnic Americans, particularly the
Hispanic-Americans lawfully in this country. We recognize that respondents raise here
legitimate and important concerns." Id.
105. [A]pplication of the exclusionary rule to civil deportation proceedings can be
justified only if the rule is to add significant protection to these Fourth Amendment
rights... . Important as it is to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of all per-
sons, there is no convincing indication that application of the exclusionary rule in
civil deportation proceedings will contribute materially to that end.
104 S. Ct. at 3488.
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a. Nature of threats to equal protection values
Some illegal alien defendants have contended that the dispropor-
tionate questioning and detention of Hispanic aliens and citizens by
the INS rises to the level of an equal protection violation.10 6 The
Supreme Court has not responded directly to that contention, but has
held that some reliance on Mexican appearance as a factor in a deci-
sion to detain is permissible.10 7 Courts apply strict scrutiny to govern-
ment classifications only if they are discriminatory in both impact and
purpose.108 It would be very difficult to establish an INS purpose to
discriminate against Mexican or Hispanic individuals. In the absence
of a showing of such a purpose, reliance on Mexican appearance does
not constitute an equal protection violation 0 9 even if there is a dispro-
106. Respondents in both United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), and
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) argued that INS officers' excessive
reliance on ethnicity violated the equal protection component of the fifth amendment. (See
infra note 109). Brief for Respondent at 46-55, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873 (1975); Brief for Respondent at 43, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976). Respondents argued that the government's stopping and interrogating persons who
appeared to be of Mexican descent constituted an invidiously discriminatory exercise of a
neutral statute, resulting in interference with that group's right to travel. The argument
relied on traditional equal protection cases such as Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 at
373-74, (1886) (ordinance allowing discrimination against Chinese owners of laundries was
unconstitutional), Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (all racial classifica-
tions are suspect and call for rigid scrutiny), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(statute preventing marriages on basis of racial classification violates the equal protection
and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment). The Court was not persuaded by
the equal protection argument in either case. See infra note 107.
107. In Brignoni-Ponce the Court indicated in dicta that apparent Mexican ancestry is a
relevant factor in a detention decision: "[t]he likelihood that any given person of Mexican
ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor. .. "
422 U.S. at 886-87. The Court held that apparent Mexican descent alone did not supply
the reasonable suspicion needed to justify an arrest in a Mexican border area. Id. at 886.
In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court held that minimally intrusive referrals for secondary
investigation at checkpoint stops were permissible even if based on apparent Mexican
ancestry. "[E]ven if it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the basis of
apparent Mexican ancestry, we perceive no constitutional violation." 428 U.S. at 563. The
Court approved referrals for secondary interrogation based largely upon apparent Mexican
ancestry at checkpoint stops in a border area but cautioned that Mexican appearance
should not be weighed as heavily at checkpoints near the Canadian border. 428 U.S. at 564
n.17. While the need to control the illegal alien population may be compelling enough to
justify using national origin as a factor, it does not justify using national origin as the only
or as a highly significant factor. Cf Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93
YALE L.J. 214, 230-33 (1983).
108. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (invidious quality of a law claimed to be
discriminatory must be traced to a discriminatory purpose; although blacks failed employ-
ment test four times as often as whites, failure to allege discriminatory purpose freed the
Court from duty to scrutinize strictly the test's use, which was rationally related to the
permissible government interest of upgrading employee abilities).
109. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment protects people only
from state action. The due process clause of the fifth amendment has been interpreted to
guarantee equal protection by the federal government. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
500 (1954); Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L. Rev.
541 (1977). Boiling is cited for the proposition that the fifth and fourteenth amendments
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portionate impact on Mexicans and Hispanics.
Some reliance on appearance of foreign origin as a justification for
detention may not rise to the level of an equal protection violation, but
undue reliance on appearance does threaten the values behind the
equal protection clause. Equal protection doctrine forbids classifica-
tions by the government that unreasonably disadvantage "discrete and
insular minorities." 110 Unreasonable INS use of appearance of foreign
origin as a criterion in detention decisions is, in effect if not by design,
an unreasonable government classification of a "discrete and insular"
minority.
INS arrests of suspected illegal aliens almost always involve indi-
viduals who appear to be of Mexican or Hispanic origin.II1 When INS
officers violate the fourth amendment by making an arrest or detention
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, 11 2 they often allow
national origin to play too great a role in the decision to arrest or
detain. Law enforcement officers have made investigatory stops and
detentions when Hispanics sat erectly in a car and did not turn to look
at a passing car 13 and when they sat low in the back seat of a type of
car often used by smugglers. 1 4 In one case a district court found that
surveillance, interrogations, and raids by INS agents, solely on the
provide coextensive protection against discrimination. Karst, supra, at 554. But the Boil-
ing Court noted, "we do not imply that [equal protection and due process] are always
interchangeable." 347 U.S. at 499.
The Court has stated that "overriding national interests" may "justify selective federal
legislation that would be unacceptable for an individual State." Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976). In Hampton, aliens challenged a civil service regulation
barring noncitizens from employment in the competitive federal civil service. Id. at 90.
The Court held that the regulation violated the fifth amendment, id. at 116-17, but based
the holding on the ground that no national interest supporting the rule had been identified.
See Karst, supra, at 552 n.61. The Court noted that a citizenship requirement for federal
service may be permissible even if such a requirement would be impermissible if imposed by
a state. 426 U.S. at 101.
110. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 1.4 (1938). Classifica-
tions burdening illegal aliens may be struck down on equal protection grounds. See Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (applying a middle level standard of equal protection review to
strike down a Texas statute withholding state funds for education of the children of illegal
aliens and authorizing local school districts to deny enrollment to such children). As noted
above, the standard of review is somewhat different under the fifth amendment. See supra
note 109.
111. 866,761 of 888,729 deportable aliens located by the INS in 1979 were Mexican.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Annual Report, Table 1, at
15 (1979). About 85% of illegal aliens in this country come from Mexico. See Department
of Justice, SPECIAL STUDY GROUP ON ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS FROM MExico: A PRO-
GRAM FOR EFFECTIVE AND HUMANE ACTION ON ILLEGAL MEXICAN IMMIGRATION 6
(1973), (cited in Lopez-Mendoza v. INS, 705 F.2d at 1071.)
112. See supra note 55.
113. United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1973).
114. United States v. Pena-Cantu, 639 F.2d 1228, 1229 (5th Cir. 1981).
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basis of appearance of Mexican ancestry, amounted to a policy. 115
The courts in these cases rejected the officers' almost total reliance on
ethnicity, holding that no detention or investigatory stop was justi-
fied. 116 Although these cases were decided on fourth amendment
grounds, they demonstrate the threat to equal protection values posed
by INS overreliance on ethnicity.
b. Incorporation of values underlying the equal protection clause in
fourth amendment balancing.
The exclusionary rule balancing test weighs social costs against
social benefits in estimating the utility of applying the rule in a given
situation.117 In Lopez-Mendoza, the Court appropriately evaluated a
wide range of the social costs of extending the rule to civil deportation
hearings. The Court considered whether significant evidence would be
excluded, and looked at the burden that an extension of the rule would
add to INS agents' practices in the field and to immigration judges'
processing of deportation hearings." 8
If a broad inquiry into the social costs of applying the exclusion-
ary rule is appropriate, it is equally appropriate to make a broad
inquiry into the social benefits of deterring fourth amendment viola-
tions. The Court did not consider the benefit to values underlying the
equal protection clause. If the Court had considered this added benefit
of deterrence in the deportation context, it might have concluded that
the benefits of applying the exclusionary rule in deportation hearings
outweighs the costs.
115. Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 398 F. Supp. 882, 901-04 (N.D. Ill. 1975), affid,
540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976), modified on other grounds, 548 F.2d 715 (1977) (en banc).
116. Some commentators argue that a probable cause standard is essential to the elimi-
nation of questioning and detention of innocent citizens. See Case Comment, Minority
Groups and the Fourth Amendment Standard of Certitude: United States v. Ortiz and
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 733 (1976).
In order to minimize the discriminatory burden on fourth amenmdent rights
that occurs when minority groups, characterized by such immutable traits as race
or national origin, are the target of "reasonable suspicion" searches and seizures,
reduction of the probable cause standard in such circumstances should be author-
ized only in the absence of less restrictive alternatives. There are sufficient non-
discriminatory alternative methods of policing the border to justify prohibiting the
Border Patrol from conducting searches and interrogation stops initiated on less
than probable cause. Consideration of less restrictive alternatives, as a matter of
fourth amendment doctrine, before approving a diminishing standard of certitude,
would ensure greater judicial solicitude for the rights of discrete and insular minor-
ities unable to protect their interests through the political process.
Id. at 763.
117. Case Comment, United States v. Janis - The Return of the "Silver Platter Doc-
trine," 12 NEw ENG. L. RPv. 789, 808 (1977) (describing test as balance "between the
societal need for the evidence which is to be removed from the public domain and the
benefit to society of the exclusionary rule in the form of its deterrent effect").
118. 104 S. Ct. at 3488-90.
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3. Costs
The Court stated that the social costs of applying the exclusion-
ary rule to deportation proceedings are "unusual and significant."' 19
The majority argued first that deportation proceedings are intended
not to punish past transgressions but to prevent their continuance or
renewal. 120 Applying the exclusionary rule would thus "require the
courts to close their eyes to ongoing violations of the law."'121 This
argument assumes that an illegal alien's mere presence in this country
is a crime. 122 In his dissent, Justice White attacked the majority's con-
struction of § 275 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, asserting
that it lists only illegal entry as an offense, not the alien's continued
presence in the country. 123
Even if a released deportation defendant is allowed to stay in the
country until he is apprehended independently of tainted evidence, the
problem is largely theoretical. Illegal aliens generally are not danger-
ous, 124 unlike some criminal defendants who are released when the
rule is applied in criminal proceedings. 125 Although economic costs
may result from the presence of millions of illegal aliens in this coun-
try, 126 the economic costs of extending the exclusionary rule to depor-
tation hearings are insignificant. 127
119. Id. at 3488.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 3488-89.
123. 104 S. Ct. at 3493-94 (White, J., dissenting). Section 275 provides that any alien
who enters the United States illegally "shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." 8 U.S.C. § 1325
(1982). The Court stated that unregistered presence is a crime, id. at 3488-89, but avoided
confronting Justice White's interpretation of section 275:
We need not decide whether or not remaining in this country following an illegal
entry is a continuing or a completed crime under § 1325. The question is aca-
demic, of course, since in either event the unlawful entry remains both punishable
and continuing grounds for deportation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2).
Id. at 3489 n.3. Section 1251(a)(2) merely provides for the deportation of an alien who has
entered illegally.
124. Aliens, fearing detection by authorities, have a particular incentive to abide by this
country's laws. "Mexican immigrants show no evidence of rejecting fundamental Ameri-
can values and institutions." CORNELIUS, CHAVEZ & CASTRO, MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS
AND SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: A SUMMARY OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE 9 (1982), quoted
in Lopez-Mendoza v. INS, 705 F.2d at 1072-73.
125. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. According to one survey, 26% of those
committed to prison have served one or more prison terms. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, UNIFORM PAROLE REP. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PAROLE
POPULATION, 1978 at 3 (1980), quoted in Lopez-Mendoza v. INS, 705 F.2d at 1073.
126. Estimates on the number of illegal aliens in the United States range from two mil-
lion to twelve million. See sources cited in 705 F.2d at 1072.
127. "If application of the rule results in aborted deportation proceedings in as many as
one hundred cases a year - a number twice as great as the number of evidentiary chal-
lenges raised before the BIA since 1952 - the result would be an increase of less than one
thousandth of one percent in the illegal alien population." Lopez-Mendoza v. INS, 705
F.2d at 1072.
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The majority also considered the likelihood of added burdens on
the administration of the deportation system. It asserted that even an
occasional fourth amendment challenge would endanger the present
simplicity of the deportation hearing system by requiring immigration
judges and attorneys to become conversant with fourth amendment
law. 128 Justice White did not share the majority's reluctance to allow
interference with the "streamlined"' 129 nature of the deportation pro-
ceeding. He pointed out the contradiction between the Court's appar-
ent willingness to tolerate ignorance of fourth amendment law among
immigration judges and lawyers and the Court's argument that INS
agents' knowledge of the law limits the effect that the exclusionary
rule would have on their practice. He also cited experience with the
rule when it was available: "there is no indication that [the rule] sig-
nificantly interfered with the ability of the INS to function." 130 Justice
White pointed out that there were fewer than fifty fourth amendment
challenges in BIA proceedings between 1952 and 1979, "despite the
fact that 'immigration law practitioners have been informed by the
major treatise in their field that the exclusionary rule was available to
clients facing deportation.' ",131
The majority suggested that application of the rule would require
officers to compile "elaborate, contemporaneous, written reports
detailing the circumstances of every arrest,"'1 32 an overwhelming bur-
den because over a million aliens are apprehended yearly. The Court
also gave weight to the INS's argument that the application of the rule
would result in the suppression of lawfully obtained information
because of agents' inability to testify precisely about what happened in
crowded, confused mass arrests.133 Justice White argued that the
majority's position amounted to a rejection not only of the exclusion-
ary rule but of the fourth amendment itself as it applies to INS
agents.' 34 He pointed out that if fourth amendment violations cannot
be ascertained for exclusionary rule purposes, "there is no reason to
think that such violations can be ascertained for purposes of civil suits
or internal disciplinary proceedings, both of which the majority sug-
gests provide adequate deterrence against Fourth Amendment viola-
tions."'1 35 Prevention of fourth amendment violations requires that
128. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. at 3489.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 3495 (White, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Lopez-Mendoza v. INS, 705 F.2d at 1071). The
lower court's reference was to IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW
AND PROCEDURE 5.2c, at 5-31 (rev. ed. 1980).
132. 104 S. Ct. at 3490.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 3495 (White, J., dissenting).
135. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
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officers meet certain standards of order during arrests.
The Court's recent clarification of the legality of factory
surveys 136 makes it likely that mass arrests will account for a higher
proportion of total INS arrests in the future. The Court may be cor-
rect in its assertion that proper implementation of the exclusionary
rule requires more detailed records than are feasible in such situations.
However, arrests that are so crowded and confused that no one
remembers what happened later are a likely setting for fourth amend-
ment violations. Justice White's observation that countenacing such
arrests rejects the fourth amendment as well as the exclusionary rule is
valid. 137
The majority concluded that the high costs associated with the
rule outweigh the slight deterrence benefit to be gained from its appli-
cation.138 Justice White concluded that "the costs and benefits of
applying the exclusionary rule in civil deportation proceedings do not
differ in any significant way from the costs and benefits of applying the
rule in ordinary criminal proceedings"'139 and that the rule should
apply in deportation proceedings. The majority opinion's estimation
of the social costs of applying the rule seems exaggerated, especially in
light of their absence when the rule was available in deportation
proceedings.
CONCLUSION
The fourth amendment exclusionary rule should apply to civil
deportation proceedings. Application of the rule would deter viola-
tions of fourth amendment rights and protect equal protection values
in the deportation context. The traditional categorization of deporta-
tion as a civil proceeding has no bearing on the need to deter fourth
amendment violations and to protect the values underlying the equal
protection clause. The deterrence to be gained from the rule's applica-
136. See INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984). See supra note 50.
137. Much of the criticism leveled at the exclusionary rule is misdirected; it is more
properly directed at the fourth amendment itself. It is true that, as many observers
have charged, the effect of the rule is to deprive the courts of extremely relevant,
often direct evidence of the guilt of the defendant. But these same critics some-
times fail to acknowledge that, in many instances, the same extremely relevant
evidence would not have been obtained had the police officer complied with the
commands of the fourth amendment in the first place.
Stewart, supra note 8, at 1392. The exclusionary rule's relation to the constitution has been
likened to a messenger's relation to bad news. "Although the immediate and irrational
reaction is to destroy the messenger, the news will remain the same." Goodpaster, supra
note 27, at 1082.
138. 104 S. Ct. at 3490.
139. Id. at 3495 (White, J., dissenting).
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tion in the immigration context is significant enough to justify the
costs of its implementation.
Robin Rowland
